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Abstract
In a recent article, Luciano Floridi explains his view of Turing’s legacy
in connection to the philosophy of information. I will very briefly survey
one of Turing’s other contributions to the philosophy of information and
computation, including similarities to Shannon’s own methodological ap-
proach to information through communication, showing how crucial they
are and have been as methodological strategies to understanding key as-
pects of these concepts. While Floridi’s concept of Levels of Abstraction is
related to the novel methodology of Turing’s imitation game for tackling
the question of machine intelligence, Turing’s other main contribution to
the philosophy of information runs contrary to it. Indeed, the seminal
concept of computation universality strongly suggests the deletion of fun-
damental differences among seemingly different levels of description. How
might we reconcile these apparently contradictory contributions? I will
argue that Turing’s contribution should prompt us to plot some direc-
tions for a philosophy of information and computation, one that closely
parallels the most important developments in computer science, one that
understands the profound implications of the works of Turing, Shannon
and others.
Floridi’s recent article [5] seems to leave little doubt that Turing’s most
important contribution to the philosophy of information was the imitation game
that he put forward [12] as a strategy for inquiring into and evaluating the
intelligence capabilities of computing machines (today we call it the Turing
test):
When one looks at Turing’s philosophical legacy, there seems to
be two risks. One is to reduce it to his famous test (Turing 1950).
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This has the advantage of being clear cut. Anybody can recognize
the contribution in question and place it within the relevant debate
on the philosophy of artificial intelligence. The other risk is to dilute
it down into an all-embracing narrative, making Turing’s ideas the
seeds of anything we do and know today.
Reads the Introduction [5].
One main contribution of Turing’s imitation game is methodological in na-
ture, constituting a powerful epistemological approach to under-defined con-
cepts. As Floridi asserts, Turing finds it more appropriate to ask a specific
question at the right level of description that can be quantified rather than
discussed ad infinitum1.
1 Meaning and levels of abstraction in Godel’s
relativization
As it is well known, at an international mathematics conference in 1928, David
Hilbert and Wilhelm Ackermann suggested the possibility that a mechanical
process could be devised that was capable of proving all mathematical assertions,
this notion referred to as the Entscheidungsproblem, or ‘the decision problem’,
made not difficult to imagine that arithmetic could be amenable to a sort of
mechanisation. The origin of the Entscheidungsproblem dates back to Gottfried
Leibniz, who having succeeded (circa 1672) in building a machine, based on the
ideas of Blaise Pascal, that was capable of performing arithmetical operations
(the Staffelwalze or the Step Reckoner), imagined a machine of the same kind
that would be capable of manipulating symbols to determine the truth value
of mathematical principles. Leibniz devoted himself to conceiving a formal
universal language, which he designated ‘characteristica universalis’, a language
which would encompass, among other things, binary language and the definition
of binary arithmetic.
In 1931, Kurt Go¨del arrived at the conclusion that Hilbert’s intention (also
referred to as ‘Hilbert’s programme’) of proving all theorems by mechanizing
mathematics was not possible under certain reasonable assumptions. Go¨del
advanced a formula that codified an arithmetical truth in arithmetical terms
and that could not be proved without arriving at a contradiction. Even worse,
it implied that there was no set of axioms that contained arithmetic free of true
formulae that could not be proved.
Theorems in a mathematical theory are formal semantic objects. They have
truth value, conveying information attesting to the truth of the facts encom-
passed, all the way from axioms, which are facts taken to be true by definition,
1Here it is also worth clarifying the point that his prediction as to when machines would
pass the test was rectified by Turing himself in a 1951 BBC radio interview (broadcast a
year later in 1952) with H. A. Newman, Sir Geoffrey Jefferson, and R. B. Braithwaite: “Can
Automatic Calculating Machines Be Said to Think?” [14], when he offered a prediction of “at
least 100 years” (at a 70% percent chance). So it shouldn’t be claimed that he was wrong, as
is claimed in [5] and many other sources.
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to the statement of the theorem itself. But Godel did something remarkable
and encoded the meaning of theorems in the syntax of the theory itself. He
did this by associating symbols with numbers in order to encode meaning in
the form of arithmetical propositions. Using a clever construction that led to a
contradiction, he proved that some of these constructions are undecidable, that
is, they cannot be assigned a meaning within the theory unless a larger more
powerful theory is used, which in turn would have new undecidables itself, hence
leading to questions of absolute undecidability.
This fundamental relativisation put an end to the discussion of the feasibility
of Hilbert’s programme, given that no matter how strong a theory could be,
there would always be meaningful statements from outside it that the theory
would be unable to encompass. The relationship between truth and the provable
was broken.
Just a few years after Go¨del, Turing arrived at very similar conclusions by
very different means. His means were mechanical, so the theorems and truths
from Go¨del’s work were now nothing but the manipulation of symbols, sequences
of tasks as mundane as those which people, then as now, were used to dealing
with on an everyday basis, these were computer programs. Turing also showed
that no matter how powerful you think a digital computer would be, it would
turn out to have serious limitations, notwithstanding its remarkable properties.
2 Turing’s one machine for everything
Alan Turing tackled the problem of decision in a different way to Go¨del. His
approach included the first abstract description of the digital general-purpose
computer as we know it today. Turing defined what in his article he termed
an ‘a’ computer (for ‘automatic’), now known as a Turing machine. Turing
also showed that certain computer programs can be decided with more pow-
erful computing machines. Unfortunately in the scheme of Floridi’s Levels of
Abstraction (LoA) [5], Turing’s derivation of a rich hierarchy pertains to incom-
putable objects. And intermediate degrees of computation are all but natural;
examples are non-constructive [11], hence of little significance to LoA.
As is widely known, a Turing machine is an abstract device which reads or
writes symbols on a tape one at a time, and can change its operation according
to what it reads, moving forwards or backwards through the tape. The machine
stops when it reaches a certain configuration (a combination of what it reads
and its internal state). It is said that a Turing machine produces an output
if the machine halts, while the locations on the tape the machine has visited
represent the output produced.
The most remarkable idea advanced by Turing is his concept of universality,
his proof that there is an ‘a’ machine that is able to read other ‘a’ machines
and behave as they would for any input. In other words, Turing proved that
it was not necessary to build a new machine for each different task; a single
machine that could be reprogrammed sufficed for all. Not only does this erase
the distinction between programs carried out by different machines (since one
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machine suffices), but also between programs and data, as one can always codify
data as a program to be executed by another Turing machine and vice versa,
just as one can always build a universal machine to execute any program.
Turing also proved that there are Turing machines that never halt, and if a
Turing machine is to be universal and hence able to simulate any other Turing
machine or computer program, it is actually expected that it will never halt for
a(n infinite) number of inputs of a certain type (while halting for an infinite
number of inputs too). This is something we are faced with in everyday life, for
even the simplest and most mundane tasks, approached using devices as simple
as Turing machines, already impose limits on our knowledge of these devices
and what they are or are not able to compute.
3 The Shannon legacy
Once approached the problem of defining an algorithm with the concept of Tur-
ing computation, a question to be considered concerns the nature of information.
Shannon did something similar than Turing for the concept of algorithm, but
for the concept of information. Not so long ago the problem of communicating
a message was believed to be related only to the type of message and how fast
one could send letters through a communication medium. When Morse code
was invented, it was clear that the number of symbols was irrelevant, it required
only two different symbols to convey any letter and therefore any possible word
and any possible message. Shannon separated information from meaning when
it came to measuring certain aspects of messages, because meaning seemed to be
irrelevant to the question of communication. The same medium could be used
for what were thought to be completely different kinds of information, such
as images, sounds and text, which today’s computers show are not essentially
different, being exactly the same at the machine level.
The computer casts the information in a form that we recognize as an image
or a sound, a password or an emoticon, but there is no essential difference
among these at the level of Shannon information theory. Shannon formally
proved [9] that any language, no matter how sophisticated, can be reduced to
a 2-symbol system of yes-no answers, and it can be so reduced quite efficiently.
This is why we can now store any sort of information in the same device. As
Turing showed with respect to computation, information storage too does not
require different media; a single medium suffices, indeed any medium (of the
same capacity) would suffice albeit noise and other relevant considerations that
Shannon himself also studied in incredible formal detail [9].
That information can be of very different kinds is significant, but what is
more remarkable is that all information can be fundamentally treated of the
same type, and only the way in which its elements are arranged results in so
many disparate meanings, to which Shannon’s measures are immune. And if
one wished to use Shannon’s entropy to distinguish between messages using the
same alphabet, one would soon find that it is unsuitable for capturing this level
of meaning, as it has been widely recognized starting by Shannon himself. But
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this is not to say that no formal low-level quantification theory can deal with
information and meaning at given levels of abstraction.
4 Building on Shannon and Turing
Algorithmic information theory [7, 1, 10, 8] (AIT), for example, is better at
dealing with subtle differences in messages and thereby capturing certain aspects
of meaning [16]. Its central measure, Kolmogorov complexity (K), not only takes
into consideration the message itself, but also its recipient and generator. It tells
us that a message can be quantified by the length in bits of the shortest computer
program that generates it. The computer program reproduces the message
and is included with the message itself, so it is in some sense autoexecutable,
regardless of the carrier. Barry Cooper points out [2] that
..., if one [limited] oneself to the usual computability models, the
notion of randomness of finite strings seems to provide a first step
toward a much needed theory of the incomputability of finite objects.
The theory of algorithmic information promises to allow some hypothesis
testing on the algorithmicity of the world [18, 17], and it even introduces the
need for an observer [16], given that one cannot calculate K directly but only by
indirect methods, making approximations subject to differences in the methods
used. But once again, it is not this relativity that makes the theory incredibly
powerful, but the objective properties of this quantification of messages and
meaning, the fact that the theory provides an invariance theorem asserting that
quantifying information content asymptotically converges to the same values
regardless of the production method, even though different observers may see
different things in the same bit sequence, interpreting it differently.
In [4], for example, the only reference to AIT as a formal context for the
discussion of information content and meaning is a negative one—appearing in
van Benthem’s contribution (p. 171 [4]). It reads:
To me, the idea that one can measure information one-
dimensionally in terms of a number of bits, or some other measure,
seems patently absurd...
I think this position is misguided. When Descartes transformed the notion
of space into an infinite set of ordered numbers (coordinates), he did not strip
the discussion and study of space of any of its interest. On the contrary, he
advanced and expanded the philosophical discussion to encompass concepts such
as dimension and curvature—which would not have been possible without the
Cartesian intervention. Perhaps this answers the question that van Benthem
poses immediately after the above remark (p. 171 [4]):
But in reality, this quantitative approach is spectacularly more
successful, often much more so than anything produced in my world
of logic and semantics. Why?
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Accepting a formal framework such as algorithmic complexity for informa-
tion content does not mean that the philosophical discussion of information
will be reduced to a discussion of the numbers involved—as it did not in the
case of the philosophy of geometry or space-time after Descartes. Thanks to
Descartes, however, Euclidian geometry eventually exhausted itself, and much
of the philosophical discussion was considered complete and settled. But we still
pursue the philosophy of Euclidian geometry because we now have a modern
perspective that keeps giving us new material with which to approach what was
done, how and why, from an hermeneutical perspective. And we have extended
the reach of the philosophy of geometry to the philosophy of modern physics. In
the future the same will happen for information if we embrace the most recent
development in theoretical computer science, with the help of theories such as
algorithmic information theory.
5 Back to Levels of Abstraction
Some things are more remarkable not because they are different but because
they are the same, even if they can be studied in different ways and at different
scales and levels of abstraction. Levels of abstraction are necessary for practical
reasons. For example, we are used to seeing things at the level at which our
physics and biology predispose us to see them; we are finite beings that can
store information in certain limited—though extraordinary—ways. One cannot
expect to reconstruct information from the bottom up with limited storage
capacity and limited understanding. We will never be able to read machine code
and see that it is obviously the source code of a sophisticated word processor,
even when the machine code is only a plain translation of the computer code in
which the software was originally programmed. It is Turing and Shannon who
taught us that software in machine code is the same thing as the same software
we interact with on our screens.
It is not that it cannot be provided a machine with the step-by-step proof
of a mathematical theorem. It’s that no one is able to follow such a detailed
description before becoming completely lost. In order for information to be
useful, it needs to be packaged for human understanding at the right level, that
is. Indeed that’s why mathematicians have been so good at creating a language
for themselves.
Indeed, access and the study of different levels of abstraction are key to
understanding our world. Concerned by the return to asking basic questions
of the kind considered by Alan Turing within the framework of computability
theory, Barry Cooper argues that uncomputability arises at certain levels of
causal explanation, at the point of interaction of local and global phenomena [2],
while at another level a phenomenon may be computable [3]:
Even in non-linear systems, such high order behaviour [emergent
phenomena] is causal — one phenomenon triggers another. Levels of
explanation, from the quantum to the macroscopic, can be applied.
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But modelling the evolution of the higher-order effects is difficult in
anything other than a broad-brush way. Such problems infiltrate all
our models of the natural world.
Unlike Cooper, I do not think this is an impediment by principle but a
practical limitation. But everything else in Cooper’s reasoning applies.
It then turns out that Turing’s main contribution to computation comple-
ments the LoA approach at the end but for different and less fundamental
reasons. If in dealing with emergent phenomena, a common task is to identify
useful descriptions and to extract enough computational content to enable pre-
dictions to be made, then it is clear that one cannot look at natural phenomena
at some arbitrary level; one will be able to compute very little if one is trying to
extract a biological discovery from a quantum effect. At some level of abstrac-
tion, where epistemological limits are of less fundamental nature, the need of
LoAs is a pragmatic necessity. Turing’s contribution is twofold, on the one hand
the novel strategy epitomized by the Turing test suggesting different levels of
description and, on the other hand, the seminal concept of Turing universality
collapsing levels in a fundamental way. They will appear contradictory if the
beauty of their elegant complementarity, fundamental and pragmatical sides, is
overlooked.
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